It is often argued that fiscal stabilisation in the euro area compares unfavourably with the US, not least because of the perceived limitations of the Stability and Growth Pact. This paper qualifies this perception by taking a closer look at fiscal policy making since the mid-1990s. It examines a number of elements which are generally overlooked or not considered in the analysis of fiscal stabilisation. In particular, on top of discretionary fiscal policy, which generally is at the core of existing studies, it also takes into account the size of automatic stabilisers. Moreover, it considers the difference between policy intentions, as formulated or perceived in real time, and actual outturns, and possible reasons for the gap between the two. On the basis of such a more specific analysis, fiscal stabilisation in the euro area appears less dire than commonly assumed. It also suggests a number of points on how to improve the track record, including by strengthening fiscal governance.
INTRODUCTION
If there was a transatlantic beauty contest for fiscal stabilisation, the euro area would, most likely, end up behind the US when applying conventional assessment criteria. The policy stance resulting from the decentralised system of policy making on this side of the Atlantic is generally taken to be less successful in ironing temporary fluctuations of output compared to the fiscal policy decisions taken in Washington. A frequently invoked episode from the recent past are the early 2000s, when following the bursting of the ICT bubble the US fiscal authorities implemented a marked discretionary fiscal expansion while fiscal policy makers in most euro-area countries did not seem to lean against the wind in spite of a marked economic slowdown. A similar, although still preliminary, assessment is being made of the current policy stance in the sense that fiscal stabilisation in the euro-area Member States seems once more lagging behind that of the US.
Beyond this specific episode, two major flaws are generally held against fiscal stabilisation in the euro area. First, fiscal policy measures are normally judged to be more hesitant and less incisive. Second and more seriously, instead of dampening cyclical swings of output, fiscal policy in the euro area has frequently been pro-cyclical, including the early 2000s: expansionary when the economy boomed and restrictive when the economy turned soar.
Both flaws seem to vindicate critics of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) − the EU framework governing fiscal policy making in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
They often argue that the 3% of GDP deficit threshold of the EU Treaty puts fiscal policy in the euro are too much into a straight jacket. It is seen as an obstacle for effective fiscal stabilisation because, if binding, it ties hands of fiscal policy makers irrespective of prevailing cyclical conditions. This paper takes a fresh look at fiscal stabilisation in the euro area and tries to qualify the traditionally unflattering comparison with the US. The analysis calls attention to a number of pivotal aspects of fiscal policy making which even though conventional are generally neglected or considered in isolation.
To begin with, the analysis of fiscal stabilisation is typically limited to discretionary policy making. The effect of so-called automatic stabilisers − budgetary arrangements which produce a stabilising effect without the explicit intervention of policy makers − is not taken into account. Explicitly or implicitly, such a partial approach could be defended on the ground that a fair judgement can reasonably be passed only on measures resulting from discretionary choices. While one may have some sympathy with this kind of reasoning − i.e. one should be held responsible only for deliberate actions -it turns a blind eye on a number of points that are not immaterial for the assessment of fiscal stabilisation.
As a first point, automatic stabilisers can differ across countries in terms of both, their size and composition. Such differences can critically shape the effectiveness of fiscal policy to stabilise output on top of or in spite of discretionary measures.
A second element gradually, yet still insufficiently, grabbing the attention of fiscal policy makers and academics alike, is the at times large gap between the actual effect of fiscal stabilisation, which can be appraised only ex post, and the policy intentions formulated in real time. The gap is not only due to the well-known time lags between identifying stabilisation needs and measures taking effect but mostly due to the notorious uncertainty surrounding the assessment of cyclical conditions. It may induce policy makers to take specific policy measures, which with the benefit of hindsight, may turn out to have been inappropriate, notably pro-cyclical. Clearly, a better understanding of policy intentions does not change the actual impact of fiscal policy. Nevertheless, insights may be exploited to improve the real-time measurement of cyclical conditions and, in turn, of fiscal stabilisation.
The third and final point of our analysis refers to the conventional distinction between discretionary fiscal stabilisation and automatic stabilisers. Although appealing, it is less clear cut and informative than generally believed. Contrary to the commonplace view, the bulk of automatic stabilisers does not originate in progressive tax codes and unemployment benefits. Automatic stabilisation mainly works through the inertia of discretionary expenditure with respect to cyclical swings in output: their share in GDP increases 'automatically' in downturns and declines in upturns. Hence, successful stabilisation via automatic stabilisers essentially depends on the type of economic shock that an economy is facing. In the event of a permanent negative shock a given level of discretionary expenditure will become unsustainable in the long run. While this may sound like a truism to some ears, it is far from evident in the policy debate. In particular, what originally may have been intended as automatic stabilisation may, with the passing of time, be interpreted as a discretionary fiscal policy measure.
Evidently, the qualifications offered in this paper do not alter the ultimate impact of fiscal policy -be it discretionary or automatic -on aggregate output. At the end of the day fiscal policy has either been counter-or pro-cyclical. On the other hand, as hinted at before, a better understanding of details and mechanisms helps rectify the appraisal of fiscal stabilisation and possibly think of ways to improve policy making.
For the sake of completeness and transparency, it is also important to stress what we do not do in our transatlantic comparison of fiscal stabilisation. We do not venture into the thorny field of assessing the exact size of the impact that fiscal measures produce on aggregate demand. We concentrate on changes in fiscal variables which, in the presence of nominal and real rigidities, are taken to produce a short-term impact on the aggregate level of economic activity.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the experience with discretionary fiscal policy for the euro area as a whole and the individual Member States and compares it with the evidence for the United States. The rest of the paper substantiates this comparison by analysing in more detail specific aspects of fiscal policy making. In particular, Section 3 shows that assessing fiscal stabilisation records is not complete without reviewing the role of automatic stabilisers. Section 4 contrasts the ex post fiscal outcomes with ex ante or real-time fiscal plans. Section 5 brings both of these elements together and highlights the difficulties in differentiating discretionary from automatic fiscal impulses in practice. Section 6 concludes and provides some policy considerations on how to reduce the euro-area's proneness to fiscal pro-cyclicality.
FISCAL STABILISATION IN THE EURO AREA: WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE?
Despite the conventional macroeconomic thinking that fiscal policy can and should contribute to smoothing temporary swings in aggregate economic activity, pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy remains a widespread phenomenon around the world. Studies find that in developing and middle income countries fiscal policy has frequently moved with the cycle. For developed economies the findings are more nuanced and depend on the time period and countries considered. When fiscal policy has been pro-cyclical in industrial countries, it has mostly been so in good economic times (see for instance Manasse, 2006 and Alesina and Tabellini, 2005) . The deficit bias in good times has largely been attributed to political economic motives as policy makers may attach more weight to objectives other than the stabilisation of output. In particular, when competing for public resources ministers neglect the repercussions of their decisions on overall public finances. This 'common pool problem' gets worse in good economic times as more overall resources are available. For a comprehensive review of the political economy of fiscal policy making, including alternative mechanisms that may give rise to pro-cyclical fiscal policy making, see Drazen (2000) .
Pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy has also emerged as a characteristic of the euro area (see e.g. Langedijk, 2004) . Since the early 1990s, when EU Member States agreed to establish an economic and monetary union and started preparing for the single European currencywhich was effectively introduced in 1999 − repeated episodes of pro-cyclical fiscal policy have been observed. On the face of it, these episodes seem to have vindicated critics who have argued that the SGP would seriously hamper the stabilisation function of fiscal policy. Such judgement was passed well before the SGP came into force -for instance by Buiter et al. (1992) -and was reiterated more forcefully − for instance by Canzoneri and Diba (2001) and Calmfors (2003) -a few years after its inception.
However, available econometric evidence on how the EU fiscal framework may have affected fiscal stabilisation in the countries adopting the single European currency is not necessarily discouraging. The introduction of the euro does not seem to have weakened the ability of fiscal policy to stabilise cyclical swings in general. Gali and Perotti (2003) were among the first to conclude that the SGP has not impaired the stabilisation role of fiscal policy. They actually find that a clear pro-cyclical pattern in the pre-Maastricht period has given way to a more counter-or a-cyclical trend after 1991. Similarly, Fatas and Mihov (2003) document that the SGP constraints seem to have mitigated the various influences that are believed to distort the use of the fiscal policy instrument.
But these findings need to be qualified on at least three accounts. First, the estimated improvement in the stabilisation property of fiscal policy in the euro area after 1991 masks a significant change in the behaviour across the different phases of the economic cycle. (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) , there is a clear pro-cyclical stance in both stages of the cycle: the fiscal stance is on average expansionary in good times and contractionary in bad times. The pattern changed in the second sub-period (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) when the eleven countries, in an effort to fulfil the Maastricht criteria for adopting the euro, ran on average tight fiscal policies irrespective of the cyclical position. 8 1981-1991 1992-1998 1999-2007 1981-1991 1992-1998 1999-2007 Change in CAPB (% of GDP)
Notes: CAPB = Cyclically adjusted primary balance. OG = output gap. The fiscal stance in the euro area has been adjusted for UMTS revenues in years [2000] [2001] [2002] . Good times correspond to periods of positive output gaps and bad times to periods of negative output gap. The euro area data are weighted averages and do not include Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovenia. Caution is needed for the interpretation of the period 1992-98 since it includes only a single year for good times (1992 for the euro area; 1998 for the US). Sources: Commission services calculations based on OECD data.
(
1 ) The EU-11 includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
2 ) The on average counter-cyclical stance in good times in 1992-1998 must be interpreted with caution since the output gap was positive only in a single year (1992) .
A second important provisio to keep in mind when considering the findings of Gali and Perotti (2003) To underscore the alleged shortcomings of the EU fiscal framework, critics often called attention to the US experience since the mid-1990s where, prima facie, fiscal stabilisation appears to have been more successful. Based on the traditional analysis (Figure 2 ) which looks only at the role of discretionary fiscal policy, fiscal policy in the euro area emerges as having been more pro-cyclical than that of the US. While this becomes already evident
from Figure 1 , which shows the discretionary stance over the three time periods in the euro area and the US, it is highlighted further in Figure 2 which depicts the discretionary fiscal stance and the cyclical conditions in both areas since 1996. All data points that lie in the upper left and lower right quadrants indicate times in which fiscal policy has been procyclical, while the other two quadrants depict counter-cyclical periods. As mentioned above, euro-area fiscal policy was characterised by strong pro-cyclical fiscal tightening in the run-up to EMU, followed by an adjustment fatigue that created a pro-cyclical fiscal loosening despite sustained economic growth ( 
FISCAL STABILISATION: IS THERE MORE TO IT THAN DISCRETIONARY MEASURES?
When analysing and discussing the impact and role for fiscal stabilisation, the focus is mostly on discretionary measures; the role played by automatic stabilisers − arrangements that help smooth output without explicit intervention of fiscal authorities − receives generally less attention, most probably because their stabilising function is, by construction, incontrovertible. However, when comparing fiscal stabilisation across countries the size of automatic stabilisers becomes an important element to take into account. Depending on their size, they may counterbalance or even completely offset procyclical discretionary policies.
When referring to automatic stabilisers, most economists and practitioners typically think of two budgetary elements that feature more or less prominently in the budget of industrialised economies: progressive tax codes and unemployment benefits. Progressive tax codes make tax revenues increase (decrease) more than proportionally when GDP rises (falls). Similarly, unemployment benefits rise and drop with the number of unemployed people, which moves in a countercyclical fashion. Both mechanisms cool (support) the economy during booms (busts) by giving rise to an increase (decline) in the budgetbalance-to-GDP ratio. 
Semi-elasticities Elasticities
Notes: Euro-area averages are GDP-weighted. A semi-elasticity measures the change in a ratio with respect to a percentage change of the denominator, i.e.
where R stand for revenues, E for expenditure, Y for GDP. Unsurprisingly, and abstracting from significant cross-country differences within the group of countries having adopted the single European currency, automatic stabilisers are markedly more important in the euro area than in the US. A cyclical drop of GDP of 1% in the euro area raises the fiscal deficit ratio by on average ½ a percentage point as opposed to an increase by around ⅓ of a percentage point in the US. Notes: Formally, the estimates represent semi-elasticities, i.e. they measure the change in the budget balance-to-GDP ratio with respect to a relative change of GDP or, equivalently, a percentage change in the output gap. The estimates of the size of automatic stabilisers are derived from a methodology developed by the OECD (see Girouard and André, 2005) and endorsed by the competent committees of the Council of the European Union and the Economic Policy Committee. The euro-area data do not include Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia. Sources: European Commission services and OECD.
As regards unemployment benefits, the other 'classical automatic stabiliser', they
The next thing to note is that, on the whole, tax systems tend to be largely proportional.
The progressive elements of income taxation are essentially balanced by the regressive character of social contributions. As a result, in both the US and the euro area, including the individual member countries, the elasticity of total taxes with respect to GDP is equal or very close to unity (second column from the right). This means that revenues essentially move in line with GDP, i.e. the revenue-to-GDP ratio remains largely constant over the cycle.
represent a very small share of total primary expenditure: around 2% in the US and 3.5%
in the euro area as a whole. Taking into account the link between unemployment and aggregate economic activity (Girouard and André, 2005 estimate an elasticity of -5.5 for the US and -4.4 in the euro area) a decline of GDP of one percentage point leads ceteris paribus to an increase in the expenditure ratio of merely one decimal point in the US and less than two decimal points in the euro area as a whole (one decimal point if simple averages are used), hardly a big impulse. ( 3 ) Thus, empirically, progressive tax codes and unemployment benefits only account for a small part of automatic stabilisation. The bulk of automatic stabilisation originates rather from the inertia in adjusting other expenditure components over the cycle. For example, if output declines temporarily, governments do generally not close schools, fire doctors and the euro area improves visibly (Figure 4) . This is especially the case in years when the in the euro area was 2 percentage points below potential, the counter-cyclical effect of the automatic fiscal stabilisers more than offset the pro-cyclical stance of discretionary fiscal policy. This gave rise to an overall expansionary fiscal impulse: The left panel of Figure 4 shows an improvement in the CAPB and thus a pro-cyclical tightening, while the right panel of the figure shows that the overall primary balance deteriorated, thus providing a countercyclical stimulus. A similar constellation was recorded in 2003, when after the bursting of the ICT bubble the euro area experienced a protracted economic slowdown.
nurses, lay off judges and soldiers or leave infrastructure projects like roads or buildings unfinished. On the contrary, expenditure plans, if drawn up on optimistic GDP forecasts, may envisage an upward trend for some expenditure categories which would not necessarily be revised in times of negative growth surprises. In other words, the implementation of discretionary expenditure levels in line with plans leans against the decline or increase in aggregate output. It is this mechanism that accounts for the largest part of automatic fiscal stabilisation across the cycle. The two commonplace candidates, progressive taxes and unemployment benefits, play at best a supporting role.
Hence, it is pre-dominantly the differences in size of governments that impact how strong automatic stabilizers are and what role they play for fiscal stabilisation as shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5 . The blue lines depict the discretionary fiscal policy stance as measured by the CAPB, while the red lines depict the total 'first-round impact' of fiscal policy as measured by the annual change of the primary deficit. When this full fiscal impact is considered (discretionary and automatic stabilisers), the stabilisation record of cycle recorded particularly strong swings. In 1993, for instance, when economic activity ( 3 ) Darby and Melitz (2008) show that also other expenditure components (health, pension, incapacity benefits and sickness pay) are pro-cyclical and play a greater role in the euro area than in the US. This 'European solution' of a greater role for automatic stabilisation has some advantages.
To start with, discretionary fiscal policy can be called to pursue more than one objective and therefore trade off stabilisation for sustainability. In that case, stronger automatic stabilisers can provide a more balanced policy stance with respect to possibly competing objectives of fiscal policy. For instance, in some years discretionary fiscal policy may be obliged to implement improvements in the structural budget balance irrespective of economic conditions to ensure long-term sustainability. In such a case the change in the overall balance will still include the effect of automatic stabilisers.
Moreover, and more importantly, automatic stabilisation avoids the negative implications that have been associated with discretionary fiscal policy making in practice. A relatively large body of research documents these shortcomings of fiscal activism. A detailed and balanced account of the 'rise and fall' of discretionary fiscal stabilisation can be found in Gordon (1980) . A recent study by the IMF presented in its World Economic Outlook (October 2008) finds mixed evidence for the impact of discretionary fiscal policy on output smoothing and highlights that, if it works at all, it only does so when the underlying fisca favour rules over discretion. Blinder (2004) nuances this conclusion somewhat. He argues that while one should in general be careful with fiscal discretion, he sees a case in favour of discretion in the event of severe negative shocks when monetary policy risks running stability also attempts to smooth output. In the EU by contrast, the relative strength of automatic stabilisers and sustainability concerns in a number of countries due to population ageing dampens the scope for discretion. These differences underlie also the different positions taken by the US and European fiscal policy makers in the current financial crisis.
The usefulness of automatic stabilisers, however, should not be interpreted as a cause for larger governments.( 4 ) Evidence suggests that over longer time spans a larger size of government does not necessarily go along with lower output costs over cycles. Two types of results can be found in this respect in the literature. Firstly, there seems to be an upper limit at which the beneficial effects of automatic stabilisers are being outweighed by longt size has a negative effect on output volatility as measured by the standard deviation of output growth. w degree of automatic stabilisation can increase with the share of discretionary government spending. This conclusion is consistent with the mechanics of the government budget, whereby fluctuations in GDP directly translate into an increase or decrease of the discretionary expenditure ratio, as well as with the findings of Gali (1994) and Darby and Melitz (2008) .
Wh sing discretionary fiscal policy making, not only outcomes but also policy intentions, based on informa considered. Since output gap estimates are derived from expectations about future run costs for economic growth through additional tax burden and inefficient public administrations. Simulations put this threshold at a maximum of 50% of GDP, but depending on economic structures, including the openness of an economy, it can also be significantly lower (see for example Buti et al., 2003 and Debrun et al., 2008) . Secondly, work along the lines of Fatas and Mihov (2001) and Koskela and Viren (2003) suggests that governmen Ho ever, in the face of such findings, it may still be concluded that, the short-term the
THE BENEFIT OF HINDSIGHT: DELIBERATE (DE)STABILISATION OR JUST (BAD) LUCK?
en asses tion about the economic cycle at the time, should be rs in the US does not necessarily mean that fiscal n of output. It rather reflects a political choice on the degree of government involvement in the economy. 4 ) The markedly lower size of automatic stabilise authorities attach a lower weight to the stabilisatio economic growth, policy makers are faced with a forecasting problem. ( 5 ) This uncertainty surrounding the economic cycle in real time can drive an important wedge between plans and outcomes. ( 6 ) To shed light on the difference between outcomes and how things looked at the time, Figure 7 depicts the information available in real time of both the economic cycle and the budget balance. ( 7 ) Real time data used are OECD estimates produced in spring of the reporting year t. This allows to closely match the real-time output gap with the real-time fiscal stance of the same year, which includes both the budget adopted at the end of t-1 plus any additional measures taken or adopted at the beginning of t. Two important points follow from the graph for the euro area. Firstly, the left panel of Figure 7 confirms the pro-cyclical stance in the second half of the 1990s reflecting the policy priorities of the EU fiscal framework in the run-up to the euro, notably to bring the government deficit below the 3% of GDP threshold. Secondly, the pro-cyclical loosening recorded in 2000
and 2001 was not in the plans. Based on the information available at the time, the fiscal stance could be taken as a 'reasoned' response to a cyclical position that was perceived to (2005) . Statistical data revisions can also explain the difference between real-time and ex post output gaps. In practice, their impact is relatively small compared to forecast errors.
Commission (2006b).
he two graphs in Figure 7 are based on OECD data for two reasons. Firstly, the OECD has consistently published real-time output gap estimates since 1995; other available real-time data sets cover a much shorter time period. And secondly, the OECD growth forecasts, which enter the real-time estimates of the output gap, are largely free of the calculated optimism to which governments' forecasts may fall pray.
be moving from potential to below-potential while, over the medium term, the economy was expected to return to the high-growth path of the late 1990s. fiscal stance appeared pro-cyclical if evaluated ex post. However, when real-time data are used, the ex ante stance appears to be counter-cyclical, especially during economic expansions. The authors do not distinguish country groups however and use real-time data published in the December issues of the OECD Economic Outlook in contrast to the Spring issues employed for the analysis here.
Using an alternative method for identifying discretionary fiscal policy with real time data von Kalckreuth and Wolff (2007) also show that fiscal policy was counter-cyclical in real time in the US. The authors argue that automatic stabilizers should depend on true (i.e. ex post) GDP, while discretionary policy depends on the information that policy makers have in real time, approximated by GDP data released in real time. They compute the measurement error between real time and ex post GDP. Any changes in the fiscal stance associated discretionary fiscal changes, because, by definition the automatic stabilisation part of fiscal policy is linked to the true state of the economy (thus, the true GDP). Using quarterly data for the US from 1965Q3 to 2005Q3, they find that government expenditure reacts counter-cyclically to the state of the economy as perceive Notes: The forecasts errors are measured as the OECD ex post output gap minus real-time estimates by the OECD of the output gap in year t produced in spring of the same year. The large difference between realtime and ex post estimates for the US in the second half of the 1990s also reflects statistical revisions of national accounts data. The largest revision took place in 1999, when GDP was raised by 1 to 2%. However, assuming that this revision had a full impact on the output gap estimate would not alter the policy implications of the real-time estimates for the US. Sources: Commission services calculations based on OECD data.
( 10 ) As shown in Footnote 6, real-time output gap estimates are derived from expectations about future economic growth. To the extent that medium-term growth prospects are overestimated (or underestimated) the real time estimate of the output gap in the current period will be on the pessimistic (or optimistic) side.
( 11 ) More generally, studies find a bias for optimism in government growth forecasts (e.g., Jonung and Larch, 2006 and Strauch et al., 2004) .
In 1996-2007, the output gap was on average underestimated by around 1 percentage point of GDP based on OECD forecasts. More specifically, throughout the whole period the forecasts consistently erred into one direction (Figure 8) . The underestimation was even bigger based on government projections. As medium-term growth projections did not
While the euro area's cumulated loss in the output gap that followed the bursting of the ICT bubble in he economic slowdown in the euro area was much more protracted. This higher degree of sluggishness in the euro-area cycle is partly due to higher market rigidities, which weigh on an apacity to adjust to adverse economic shocks. Indicators measuring various as employment protection legislation, product market regulations or the administrative burden for business firms typically place the euro area i 12 of growth was unlikely to be permanent, the policy response was to reduce taxes or to increase expenditure at a moment when the materialise, especially after 1999, and taking into account that it is generally easier to cope with positive growth surprises, the planned fiscal stance turned out to be inappropriate from a stabilisation point of view.
By contrast, the US grew more strongly than projected in the late 1990s, giving rise to lower than expected output gaps (Figure 8 ), but since then growth surprises have been small. This seems to be a sign of a more realistic or conservative assessment of mediumterm growth prospects, explaining the better track record for fiscal stabilisation.
The series of large negative growth surprises in the euro area could partly reflect its lower adjustment capacity, or equivalently, a backlog of structural reforms, compared to the US. Policy makers had been confronted with buoyant tax revenues since 1996, which went beyond the expansion of aggregate economic activity and led to an increase above the long-term average implicit tax rates (Figure 9 ). Although due diligence should have led to the conclusion that the above average tax content economy was de facto operating above its potential. This choice turned out to be particularly unfortunate also for the following years, as it substantially reduced the room for macroeconomic stabilisation during the economic slowdown that followed 2001. Notes: The average tax elasticity is shown as estimated for the euro area-11 by the OECD (see Girouard and André (2005) . Sources: Commission services and OECD. However, policy decisions are or have to be taken in real tim
DISCRETIONARY OR
At the heart of the problem, following onto the discussion in Section 4 on the difficulty to rectly and timely assess the economy's position in the cycle, lies the uncertainty about pointing the nature of economic fluctuations, i.e. the duration of shocks. In particular, moment a shock hits an economy it is very difficult to assess whether it will be e.
Therefore, any decision to let automatic stabilisers play entails an implicit or explicit judgement on the sustainability of the level of discretionary expenditure. If a government does not adjust discretionary spending when GDP growth slows or even drops, but rather lets the expenditure-to-GDP ratio raise, such a judgement amounts to the assumption or stabilisation:
from discretionary to automatic or vice versa. ( 13 ) The late 1990s and early 2000s, when
. In case a shock is judged to be temporary (permanent) existing decomposition methods are likely to show premise that the level of economic activity will eventually move back to the trend prevailing prior to the economic shock. On the contrary, if the assessment finds the shock to be of a permanent nature and the expenditure-to-GDP ratio not to be sustainable, a discretionary expenditure adjustment would need to follow. Thus, whether the change in the fiscal policy stance would be considered as automatic or discretionary largely depends on how the economic shock is viewed. This view may change over time.
For a given annual change of the nominal-budget-balance-to-GDP ratio, any reassessment of potential output implies a shift in the composition of fiscal policy makers in a number of euro-area countries built their successive medium-term fiscal plans on the expectation that economic growth would stay or return to the path observed before the ICT burst in 2001, are an interesting example. Because of the assumed stability of the past growth trends, a comparatively large share of the projected annual change in the balance-to-GDP ratio was, in real time, taken to reflect the working of automatic stabilisers. As the economic slowdown drew on and policy makers had to realise that the shock was rather permanent, part of what was thought to be automatic stabilisation turned into discretionary fiscal policy.
In point of fact, the line that separates discretionary and automatic stabilisation is conditional on a given assessment of the medium-term growth prospects The shift from automatic to discretionary is even more pronounced in terms of expenditure levels. As indicated in the last column of Table 3 , in 2000 and 2001 the noncyclical primary expenditure ratio in the euro area was overestimated by as much as 1 percentage point of GDP; that is primary expenditure in the order of 1% of GDP was first thought to be of a temporary nature in real time, but turned out to stay in the governments books permanently.
s an illustration of this mechanism in Table 3 reports the composition of the observed -budget-balance-to-GDP ratio for the euro area ( 14 ) From an ex-post standpoint, such transformations from automatic to discretionary give rise to the pattern discussed by Buti and Sapir (1998) . At the beginning of an economic downturn euro-area Member States, on top of the effect of automatic stabilisers, implement discretionary expansions which later on are reversed once it is realised that economic activity does not return to the previous growth path. ( 15 ) The difference between the annual change of the budget balance-to-GDP ratio in real time and ex post includes a number of factors, most importantly statistical revisions. In order to abstract from such revisions we perform the decomposition into discretionary and automatic on the real time change of the nominal budget balance-to-GDP ratio. This way, we can isolate the effect stemming from the revision of medium-term growth projections only. 
SUMMARY AND POLICY CONCLUSIONS
By including a number of factors that are generally not considered in standard analyses, this paper argues that fiscal policy in the euro area has been more successful in stabilising output than commonly perceived. As a result, the prima facie evidence of a rather unfavourable performance compared with the US since the mid-1999s needs to be qualified.
The apparent tendency in the euro area to run pro-cyclical policies is based on a partial assessment of fiscal stabilisation. Firstly, it is limited to discretionary fiscal policy making and ignores automatic stabilisers, the size of which is significantly larger in the euro area than in the US. In years when the economy takes a particularly steep dive or upturn, the effect of automatic stabilisers in the euro area can offset (or correct) discretionary measures. Secondly, fiscal policy in the euro area has also been geared towards achieving long-term sustainability. In light of such multiple objectives, the presence of large bilisation has to be brought about by discretionary measures. Even though discretionary stabilisation has y optimistic about the resilience of their economy. This (mis)led them to implement discretionary expansions, sometimes by spending extra revenues, in
The final point of our analysis was to argue that the line of demarcation between automatic stabilisers has been useful in ensuring that the output stabilisation goal is not overlooked.
In the US by contrast, automatic stabilisers play a lesser role and fiscal sta been prone to a number of well-recognized shortcomings, relying more on fiscal discretion reflects the American choice against a large size of government.
Part of the apparent weakness of discretionary stabilisation in the euro area originated in This seemingly lagged or slow reaction on this side of the Atlantic concerning the role of fiscal stimulus should, however, not be read as a sign of political failure or indifference.
Rather, there are good arguments that explain more caution and country-differentiated responses in fiscal stimulus measures in the euro a comfortable cushion in the economic slowdown, reducing the necessity for immediate discretionary stabilisation. Secondly, in a number of euro-area countries the current crises reflects a supply shock that requires some adjustment of the economy (e.g. the oversized construction sectors in Ireland and Spain) which cannot be cured with fiscal stabilisation. Therefore, putting aside the structural reform agenda in favour of fiscal expansion carries the risk of building up an unsustainable fiscal position. And thirdly, in spite of the impressive progress m number of euro-area countries does still not ensure sustainability especially in the light of the imminent budgetary impact of ageing. The financial crisis and the contingent liabilities taken on board by governments have further endangered sustainability. As a result, and taking into account that by experience it is difficult to reverse temporary measures, there also reflect the overoptimistic assessment of the growth outlook in contrast to the quicker downward adjustments in the US projections.
Turning to the longer-term perspective, the following policy conclusions can be drawn uropean Commission (2008) , where information on the capacity utilisation was incorporated in the estimation of potential output and the output gap, reveal significant potential for improving on current methods.
However, since the uncertainty surrounding forecasts can at best be reduced not eliminated it should be made clear in practice that an assessment of fiscal stabilisation in real time, in particular the distinction between discretion and automatic, is conditional on from revisiting the fiscal stabilization record in the euro area.
Stronger national budgetary institutions: Experience, including in the EU, has shown that strong budgetary institutions, in particular numerical fiscal rules and medium-term budgetary frameworks, can contribute to greater fiscal discipline and stabilisation. ( 16 ) Certain types of fiscal rules, especially medium-term nominal expenditure rules, have helped contain pressures for additional expenditure or tax cuts in good times, thereby reducing pro-cyclicality. This success has built on strong political commitment and effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.
More cautious macroeconomic forecasts:
Better fiscal governance could also help remedy the macroeconomic forecast bias. One option would be to involve independent fiscal institutions in preparing macroeconomic assumptions for the budget. Empirical studies indicate that fiscal authorities in the EU counting on forecasts produced by independent agencies have had a better fiscal performance. A detailed discussion of the role of independent fiscal agencies can, for instance, be found in Jonung and Larch (2006) and Debrun et al. (2007) . 
